In the aftermath of the financial crisis, there is interest in reforming bank regulation such that capital requirements are more closely linked to a bank's contribution to the overall risk of the financial system. In our paper we compare alternative mechanisms for allocating the overall risk of a banking system to its member banks. We explicitly take into account that overall risk as well as each bank's risk contribution changes once bank capital requirements change and therefore assign capital requirements based on a fixed point at which risk contributions equal capital requirements.To measure how systemic risk changes with bank capital we use a model that explicitly incorporates contagion externalities present in the financial system. We have access to a unique data set of the Canadian banking system, which includes individual banks' loan books, risk exposures, as well as detailed information on interbank linkages including OTC derivatives. We find that macroprudential capital allocations can differ by as much as 50% from observed capital levels and are not trivially related to bank size or individual bank default probability. Macroprudential capital allocation mechanisms reduce default probabilities of individual banks as well as the probability of a systemic crisis by about 25%. Our results suggest that financial stability can be enhanced substantially by implementing a systemic perspective on bank regulation.
Introduction
Under our plan ... financial firms will be required to follow the example of millions of families across the country that are saving more money as a precaution against bad times. They will be required to keep more capital and liquid assets on hand and, importantly, the biggest, most interconnected firms will be required to keep even bigger cushions.
US Treasury Secretary Geithner (2009)
The recent financial crisis has demonstrated the adverse effects of a large scale breakdown of financial intermediation for other banks as well as the rest of the economy. The concern that a failure of a large bank would trigger a chain reaction of insolvencies in the financial sector was often brought forward to justify large scale government intervention and bailouts of failed institutions. The failure of banks causes these externalities because financial institutions are directly linked through interbank loans and derivatives. However, the adverse consequences that a bank failure brings for other banks as well as the economy as a whole is not considered in current bank regulation. While academics, international institutions, and central bankers have argued for some time that bank regulation should be designed from a system perspective (Borio (2002) ), bank regulation is currently aimed at the level of the individual bank. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, there is a growing consensus amongst regulators to bring a macroprudential perspective into bank regulation. One proposal is to require financial institutions to internalize the externalities they impose on the system by adjusting capital requirements so that they better reflect an individual bank's contribution to the overall risk of the financial system. We refer to these adjusted capital requirements as macroprudential capital requirements.
In this paper, we derive macroprudential capital requirements based on five approaches to measure each bank's contribution to overall risk: component and incremental value-at-risk from the risk management literature (Jorion (2007) ), two allocation strategies using Shapley values, and the ∆CoVaR measure introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) . Computing macroprudential capital requirements, however, is more complex than computing risk contributions because once new capital requirements are implemented, bank probabilities of default (PDs), default correlations, the total risk in the banking system, and thus each bank's risk contribution will change. We therefore have to follow an iterative procedure to solve for a fixed point for which capital allocations to each bank are consistent with the contributions of each bank to the total risk of the banking system under the proposed capital allocations. To our knowledge, we are the first to do so. In our sample we find that risk attributions can differ from macroprudential capital allocations by a factor of up to three.
To find the fixed point at which risk contributions equal capital requirements we need a model to analyze how overall risk in the banking system changes when capital requirements change. We build a structural model fitted to our data that includes spillover and contagion effects through network and asset fire sale externalities similar to the models used by central banks. 1 We start with a macro stress scenario which causes varying increases in PDs for different economic sectors affecting all banks' loan portfolios. Conditional on the macroeconomic shock, we simulate loan losses for each bank using a portfolio credit risk model. Using a variant of the model by Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005) that differentiates banks according to the riskiness of their assets, we assume that banks with an insufficient regulatory capital ratio start selling assets to a market with inelastic demand and the resulting drop in prices forces other banks to sell assets as well. Banks that default either because of loan losses or decreasing asset valuations are not able to fully honor their interbank promises, potentially causing the contagious default of other banks. Clearing in the interbank market is captured using a network model as in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) . The spillover effects from asset fire sales and contagious defaults make the correlation of banks' asset values dependent on the health of the overall financial system. For a given set of capital requirements the model allows us to simulate the joint distributions of bank losses and defaults which will then be used to compute each bank's risk contribution.
We use a unique data set of the six largest Canadian banks as a representation of the whole Canadian banking system since they hold 90.3% of all banking assets. Our sample contains detailed information on the composition of the loan book, including the largest loan exposures of individual banks.
We are the first to analyze a dataset that includes the full network of exposures from OTC derivatives as well as exposures between banks arising from traditional inter-bank lending and cross-shareholdings. While derivatives are often blamed for creating systemic risk, the lack of data in many countries (including the U.S.) makes it hard to verify.
Our expanded dataset enables us to better capture linkages among banks and contagious bank defaults.
With the same amount of overall capital in the banking system, we find that macropruden-tial capital requirements can reduce the default risk of the individual bank as well as the risk of a systemic crisis by about 25%. Macroprudential capital allocations differ from current observed capital levels by up to 50% for individual banks, and the reallocation of capital that the macroprudential rules suggest are not trivially related to bank size, bank PD, or risk weighted assets. While different risk allocation mechanisms result in slightly different macroprudential capital requirements, we find that all of them work almost equally well. We find evidence that regulators are better off moving from the current regulatory regime to any macroprudential approach. We also find that ignoring our information on derivatives and cross shareholdings gives us a very different picture of individual bank risk, with potentially important effects on systemic risk. This speaks to the importance of obtaining better information about exposures between financial institutions.
In the literature we find two main approaches to measure and allocate systemic risk. Most studies use stock market data to get information on banks' correlation structure and potential spillovers. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) propose the ∆CoVaR measure, which they compute for a panel of financial institutions and regress on bank characteristics. Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) use systemic expected shortfall to compute risk attributions for a large sample of US banks. 2 This literature is related to existing studies of contagion in financial markets (see among others Forbes and Rigobon (2002) , Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) ).
Another stream of research builds on a network model in conjunction with an interbank clearing algorithm introduced by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) . Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006a) and Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai, Kapadia, Martin, Mora, Sterne, and Willison (2009) use a dataset of interbank linkages for the Austrian and British banking system, respectively, and compute measures of systemic risk and systemic importance for individual banks, conditional on a forward-looking stress scenario. Upper (2007) reviews that literature. We need to follow the second approach, because we need to model how systemic risk changes when bank capital changes.
These two complementary approaches can be interpreted in light of economic theories of financial amplification mechanisms at work during a financial crisis. For example, the seminal paper by Allen and Gale (1994) shows how asset prices can be optimally determined by cashin-the-market pricing in a crisis period. Allen and Gale (2000) propose a model of contagion through a network of interbank exposures. Shin (2008) develops a theory of liquidity spillover across a network of financial institutions resulting from expansions and contractions of balance sheets over the credit cycle. Krishnamurthy (forthcoming) reviews the literature on the mechanisms involving balance-sheet and asset prices, and those involving investors' Knightian uncertainty. Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009) conduct a simulation study of a stylized banking system and find that the systemic importance of an institution increases in its size as well as its exposure to common risk factors. They use Shapley values to allocate risk measured by value-at-risk as well as expected loss.
We extend previous research in two ways: first we highlight that changing capital requirements change the risk and correlation structure in the banking system and that macroprudential capital requirements have to be seen as a fixed point problem. Second, we provide empirical evidence that macroprudential capital requirements can reduce individual as well as systemic risk using actual data for a whole banking system.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the approaches to assign macroprudential capital requirements, the model for assessing systemic risk is described in Section 3, and Section 4 details credit loss scenario generation and the data. We present the results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
Macroprudential capital requirements
Setting macroprudential capital requirements raises two fundamental questions. First, what is the total level of capital required in the banking system, which determines the overall magnitude of the shock that a banking system can withstand? Second, how to break down the overall risk of the banking system and set capital requirements equal to each banks' contribution to systemic risk? The first question is a policy decision balancing efficiency of financial intermediation with overall stability of the system which we do not address in this paper. We focus on the second question by comparing alternative mechanisms to reallocate capital among banks, for a given level of total capital in the system.
Macroprudential capital requirements differ from risk contribution analysis as it is used in portfolio or risk management. In a risk management or portfolio management setting we want to compute risk contributions for a given portfolio with an exogenous level of overall risk. Using the same approach to compute macroprudential capital requirements in a banking system would be incorrect because both the overall risk and each bank's contribution depend on the capital allocation. As banks hold more capital they are less likely to default through either direct losses or contagion. Reallocating bank capital changes the overall risk of the banking system and thus each bank's risk contribution.
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Estimating macroprudential capital requirements is therefore a fixed point problem. We have to reallocate bank capital such that the risk contribution of each of the n banks to total risk equals the allocated capital. To measure by how much the risk of the system changes once we reallocate capital we need a model. Computing macroprudential capital requirements cannot be done as a purely empirical exercise. Assume that there is a model, like the one in this paper, that estimates a banking systems' joint loss distribution Σ(C) for a given vector of bank capital endowments C = (C 1 , ..., C n ). A risk sharing rule f (Σ) then allocates the overall risk Σ(C) to individual banks. A consistent capital allocation C * must then satisfy
The difference between performing a risk contribution analysis and the fixed point can be substantial. In Appendix A we document that capital adjustments based on risk contribution analysis can differ from adjustments based on the fixed point by a factor of three.
Because of the high degree of non-linearity in our model, the fixed point in equation (1) can only be found numerically. 4 Our model, which we describe in detail in Section 3, is simulation based. For each of our m simulated scenarios we record the profit or loss for each bank to get the joint loss distribution for all banks, i.e. we get an n × m matrix of losses, which we call L. We then allocate the risk of the whole system to each individual bank using different risk allocation methodologies f (.).
3 Changing bank capital requirements might also change individual bank risk through another channel: Capital requirements might make certain assets more or less attractive and thus can create a long-term incentive to change banks asset portfolios. Most empirical papers in the literature face this problem. We do not consider this channel in our analysis for two reasons: First, macroprudential capital requirements can be continuously adjusted as banks' asset portfolios change. Most banks report their asst portfolio composition very frequently to supervisors and at least a commercial bank's loan portfolio cannot be fundamentally changed quickly. Second, we believe that the direct effect that changes in capital have on bank solvency risk outweigh the indirect incentive effects on banks' optimal asset choice. 4 We find that it takes on average 20 iterations until the norm of the changes in capital requirements from one iteration to the next is less that $500,000. Due to the non-linearity of the problem we cannot prove that the fixed point is unique, but as detailed in Appendix A we check for robustness by using alternative starting values and find convergence to the same point for our data.
We now review the risk sharing methodologies that we use to compute macroprudential capital requirements.
Component value-at-risk (beta)
Following Jorion (2007) we compute the contribution of each bank to overall risk as the beta of the losses of each bank with respect to the losses of a portfolio of all banks. Let l i,s be the loss of bank i in scenario s and l p,s = i l i,s , then
. Furthermore let C i be the preexisting tier 1 capital of bank i. We reallocate the total capital in the banking system according to the following risk sharing rule
where C β i is the reallocated capital of bank i. A nice property of this rule is that the sum of the betas equals one, so a redistribution of total capital amongst the banks is straightforward.
Incremental value-at-risk
We first compute the value-at-risk (VaR) of the joint loss distribution of the whole banking system, which we get by adding the individual losses across banks in each simulated scenario.
We chose a confidence level of 99.5% and run 1,000,000 scenarios. The portfolio VaR, VaR p , is therefore the 5,000 th largest loss of the aggregate losses l p . Next we compute the VaR of the joint distribution of all banks except bank i, VaR −i , as the 5,000 th largest value of the
The incremental VaR therefore can be interpreted as the increase in risk that is generated by adding bank i to the system.
5
While component VaR computes the marginal impact of an increase in a bank's size, in- 5 We calculate VaR −i by adding the losses from all banks except bank i. Another way would be to remove bank i from the banking system and then compute the loss distribution of the reduced system. We decided against the latter approach, because removing a bank would leave holes in the remaining banks' balance sheets when claims on bank i do not equal liabilities to bank i as it is the case in our sample.
cremental VaR captures the full difference in risk that one bank will bring to the system. The disadvantage of the second risk decomposition is that the sum of the incremental VaRs does not add up to the VaR of the banking system. In our analysis, however, we found that difference to be small (below 5%) and thus scale iVaR capital requirements such that they sum up to the existing total bank capital: To compute Shapley values we have to define the characteristic function v(B) for a set B ⊆ N of banks, which assigns a capital requirement to each possible subset of banks.
8 In our analysis we use two risk measures to define capital requirements: expected tail loss (EL) and value-at-risk. To compute v(B) we add the profits and losses for all the banks in B across scenarios to get the joint loss distribution for B, i.e. l B,s = i∈B l i,s . We assume a confidence level of 99.5% and then assign to v(B) either the corresponding VaR, which is the 5,000 th largest loss of l B , or the expected tail loss, i.e. the arithmetic average of the 5,000 biggest losses. 6 While Shapley values were originally developed as a concept of cooperative game theory, they are also equilibrium outcomes of noncooperative multi-party bargaining problems (see e.g. Gul (1989) ).
7 Shapley values are commonly used in the literature on risk allocation. Denault (2001) reviews some of the risk allocation mechanisms used in this paper, including the Shapley value. See also Kalkbrener (2005) . In a recent paper, Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009) propose to use Shapley values to allocate capital requirements to individual banks.
8 A potential caveat of this methodology is that all characteristic function games assume that the value v(B), which a group of banks B can achieve, is independent of how the other banks that are not in B group together. David and Lehar (2009) analyze under what conditions banks find it optimal to merge to avoid bankruptcy costs using a bargaining game in partition form, which defines the value of a coalition conditional on the coalition structure of the remaining banks. They find that under certain conditions bargaining can break down and inefficient liquidations occur.
Define furthermore v(∅) = 0, then the Shapley value for bank i, equal to its capital requirement, can be computed as:
Because the sum of the Shapley values will in general not add up to the total capital that is currently employed in the banking system, we scale the Shapley values similar to Equation (4):
One potential caveat of all macroprudential capital requirements is that capital allocations can be negative, for example if a bank is negatively correlated with the other banks and therefore reduces the risk of the system. This problem also applies to the Shapley value procedure.
Unless we assume monotonicity, i.e. v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ), the core can be empty and
negative Shapley values can be obtained. For our sample this problem did not occur since bank correlations were sufficiently high.
∆CoVaR
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) we define CoVaR if bank i as the value-at-risk of the banking system conditional on bank i realizing a loss corresponding to its VaR. However, since we have to compute the loss distribution by simulation, we observe cases for which a bank realizes a loss exactly equal the VaR with measure zero. We therefore define CoVaR i for bank i
where we set = 0.1. 9 We then calculate
To get the overall capital requirements we scale the results with total capital
Benchmarks
One benchmark that we use against systemic capital requirements is banks' current capital levels. These might differ from minimum capital requirements as banks want to hold reserves against unexpected losses from risks that are not included in current regulation. Capital levels might also differ due to lumpiness in capital issuance. Most banks have issued new capital before our sample period and individual banks could not have found adequate investment projects for all the funds that they have raised and thus show excessive capital levels. To address the latter problem, we create a second benchmark, for which we redistribute the existing capital such that each bank has the same regulatory capital ratio, which is defined as tier 1 capital over risk weighted assets (RWA). 10 We refer to this benchmark as the "Basel equal" approach for the rest of the paper:
We now turn to a description of the model used to generate the system loss distribution.
A Model of the Banking System

Description of the model
Our model is designed to include externalities that are caused by a bank's distress or default.
When a bank suffers an adverse shock to its asset portfolio and is not fulfilling its capital requirements it will start selling assets to improve its capital ratio. With inelastic demand asset prices will drop causing mark-to-market losses for other banks that hold the same assets. When these losses are high enough, the other banks will start selling, too, initiating a downward spiral in asset prices. We explicitly model these asset fire sale (AFS) externalities using an extension of Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005) . When banks default and are therefore not able to pay their obligations in the interbank market they can cause other banks to default as well. We model these network externalities explicitly by clearing the interbank market and identifying banks that are in contagious default.
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To model the network of interbank obligations we extend the model of Eisenberg and Noe The total value of a bank is the value of its assets minus the outside liabilities A i − D i plus the value of all net payments to and from counterparties in the banking system. If the total value of a given bank becomes negative, the bank is insolvent. In this case we assume that its assets are reduced by a proportional bankruptcy cost Φ. After outside debtholders are paid off, any remaining value is distributed proportionally to creditor banks. We denote by d ∈ R N + the vector of total obligations of banks toward the rest of the system, i.e.
N ×N which is derived by normalizing x ij by total obligations.
When an institution is unable to meet its obligations, it may be forced to sell assets at prices well below their fair value to achieve a quick sale. We integrate the impact of such AFS of a distressed institution on both its own mark-to-market balance sheet and those of other institutions holding the same class of assets. For this purpose, we extend the work done by Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005) , in which banks were assumed equally risky, by differentiating banks according to the riskiness of their assets. We assume that the equilibrium market price of the illiquid assets of a bank is a decreasing function of their riskiness.
For each bank, the stock of outside assets, A i , is divided into liquid and illiquid assets. Bank i's stock of liquid assets is given by λ i and includes cash, government's securities and government insured mortgages. Exposures between banks are also assumed liquid for simplicity. The remainder of the bank's assets, e i , are considered illiquid. The price of the illiquid asset of bank i, p i , is determined in equilibrium, and the liquid asset has a constant price of 1. Thus the net worth of bank i assuming all interbank claims get paid in full is the sum of illiquid assets, liquid assets, and payments due from other banks minus payments to other banks and senior depositors:
We model capital requirements in the spirit of the Basel II capital accord. Since all liquid assets are backed by the government, they carry a zero risk-weight. Illiquid assets of bank i are assumed to attract a risk-weight equal to the average risk-weight of the bank's balance-sheet, w i , and the average risk-weight of all banks' assets is w. For the mark-to-market value of the banks' illiquid assets to reflect their riskiness, we assume that the price of bank i's assets, p i , is a linear function of the equilibrium average price p, and the deviation of the bank risk-weight from the banking sector mean,
where κ > 0 to ensure that assets sold by a riskier bank have lower mark-to-market value.
We describe a banking system as a tuple (Π, e, λ, D, d, p) for which we define a clearing payment vector X * . The clearing payment vector has to respect limited liability of banks and proportional sharing in case of default and denotes the total payments made by the banks under the clearing mechanism. We follow the formulation in David and Lehar (2009) to incorporate liquidation costs and define each component of X * as
To find a clearing payment vector, we employ a variant of the fictitious default algorithm developed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) .
Banks must satisfy a minimum capital ratio which stipulates that the ratio of the bank's Tier 1 capital to the mark-to-market risk-weighted value of its assets must be above some prespecified minimum r * . 12 When a bank violates this constraint, we assume that it has to sell assets to reduce the size of its balance-sheet. 13 We denote by s i the units of illiquid assets sold by bank i. 14 Whereas Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005) used a simple (non risk-weighted) leverage ratio, our constraint is closer in spirit to the Basel II accord in which banks have to hold capital commensurate with the risk on their balance sheet. 15 Our minimum capital requirement is therefore given by
The numerator is the equity value of the bank where the interbank claims and liabilities are calculated in terms of the realized payments. The denominator is the marked-to-market riskweighted value of the bank's assets after the sale of s i units of the illiquid assets. The underlying assumption is that assets are sold for cash and cash does not have a capital requirement. Thus if the bank sells s i units of the illiquid assets, the value of the numerator is unchanged since this involves only a transformation of assets into cash, while the denominator is decreased since cash has zero risk-weight. Thus, by selling some illiquid assets, the bank can increase the regulatory capital ratio. 16 We assume that banks cannot short-sell assets, i.e. s i ∈ [0, e i ]. An equilibrium is the triple (X * , S * , p * ) consisting of a vector of payments, vector of sales of illiquid assets , and vector of prices p of the illiquid assets such that:
• For all banks i ∈ N , x * i is determined according to equation (14).
• For all banks i, s * i is the smallest sale that ensures that the capital adequacy condition is 12 In the numerical exercise, the required minimum is set at 7 percent, as imposed by the Canadian regulator. 13 We do not consider the possibility of raising fresh capital nor the need to sell assets because of a loss of funding. The consequences of the latter would be similar to those described here, assuming the new securities would have to be sold at a discount.
14 Selling liquid assets does not help to reduce the size of the balance-sheet because of their zero-risk weight. Note however, that holding more liquid assets reduces the size of the balance-sheet ex-ante. 15 In addition to the distinction between liquid and illiquid assets done in Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005) , we differentiate banks according to the riskiness of their illiquid assets. Without doing so, riskier banks would unrealistically find it easier to reduce the size of their balance-sheets. 16 A decrease in price should be seen as the average price decrease of all the illiquid assets on the balance-sheet, some assets' price potentially being unaffected while others suffering from huge mark-to-market losses.
satisfied. If there is no value of s i ∈ [0, e i ] for which the capital condition is satisfied then
• There is a downward sloping demand curve q −1 (.) such that p
The first condition reiterates the limited liability of equity holders, and the priority of debt holders over interbank liabilities. The second condition says that either the bank is liquidated altogether, or its sales of illiquid assets reduces its assets sufficiently to comply with the capital adequacy ratio. Finally, the third condition stipulates that the price of the illiquid assets is determined by the intersection of a downward-sloping demand curve and the aggregate supply curve.
The inverse demand curve for the illiquid asset is assumed to be
where is α a positive constant. We define p min = p( i e i ) as the lowest average price for the illiquid assets when all assets are sold.
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By rearranging the capital condition in Equation (15), we can write the asset fire sale s i as a function of p i , where s i = 0 if capital is already above the minimum required,
Since each s i (p) is decreasing in p, the aggregate sale function is decreasing in p. The lower the price, the lower the mark-to-market value of banks' assets, and the bigger the need to sell assets to bring capital ratios in line with the required regulatory minimum. The price adjustment process is illustrated in Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005) .
An equilibrium price of the illiquid asset is a price p * such that aggregate supply is equal to
17 The demand curve (parameter α) and the asset price function (parameter κ) need to be calibrated such that an equilibrium price exists for all potential positive levels of aggregate supply. We assume an exogenously fixed lower bound on the asset price and then calibrate α accordingly.
From the solution of the clearing problem, we can gain additional economically important information with respect to systemic stability. A bank is in default whenever it cannot meet its interbank obligations, (x * i < d i ). We refer to the default of bank i as fundamental if bank i is not able to honour its promises under the assumptions that all other banks honor their promises and that prices are not affected by AFS (p = 1)
We define a bank to default because of AFS, whenever the bank is not in fundamental default but cannot honour its interbank obligations at the equilibrium price of the illiquid assets, even when all other banks meet their interbank obligations. An AFS default occurs when
A contagious default occurs, when bank i defaults only because other banks are not able to keep their promises, i.e.,
To use the model for risk analysis, we model shocks to banks' asset values by introducing a distribution of banks' credit losses as described in Section 4. As there is no closed form solution for the distribution of the clearing vector X * , we have to resort to a simulation approach where each draw from the credit loss distributions, which we refer to as a scenario, maps into new asset values for each bank. We solve the clearing problem for each scenario numerically. Thus from an ex-ante perspective we can assess expected default frequencies, and decompose insolvencies across scenarios into fundamental, AFS, and contagious defaults.
Model properties
Our network model is able to capture two properties that we believe are important in modeling systemic risk: spillover effects and feedback loops. When a bank gets in distress it sells assets or defaults on its interbank claims, causing externalities for other banks. An increase in a bank's PD will therefore make asset fire sales and default in the inter-bank market more likely, and therefore increase the PDs of the other banks in the system. This spillover effect makes the correlation of bank asset values dependent of the health of the overall system. When all banks are well capitalized, asset fire sales and interbank defaults are unlikely and correlation of banks asset portfolios is driven by the correlation in the outside assets, i.e. the loan portfolios, alone. In an asset fire sale or contagion scenario, all asset values fall, exhibiting a correlation close to one. As the capitalization of the whole banking system decreases, the probability of realizing the asset fire sale or contagion scenario increases and thus the ex-ante asset and default correlation.
The feedback effect is driven by the asset fire sale externalities and is described in detail in Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005) . When a bank starts selling assets, prices drop, which causes other banks to violate their capital requirements and forces them to sell assets as well, causing all banks' asset values to drop even further. This feedback effect accelerates bank defaults as bank capitalization decreases.
To illustrate these two effects we compare our model to a Merton model. Figure 1 shows the PDs of banks 2 and 3 in our sample for different levels of bank three's capitalization while leaving the other banks' capital levels unchanged. The solid line represents the PD for bank 3 under the network model. As a benchmark we calibrate a Merton model such that the one year PD and its first derivative of the Merton model match the PD and its derivative of the network model. 18 The resulting PD from the Merton model (dashed line) is below the PD from the 18 Given that we compute all values under a macro stress test scenario, we cannot use stock market data to calibrate the Merton model. The Merton model gives us a bank's PD given the market value of the assets V , the face value of debt, the asset growth rate µ and volatility σ, and a time horizon. We assume a time horizon of one year, set the face value of debt equal to D i + d i , and assume µ = 0.05. The bank's PD is then given
2 /2)/σ. We then solve for the two unknowns V and σ by solving the following two conditions: First, we require the Merton-PD to match the PD from our model. Second the partial derivative of the PD with respect to changes in book value of equity E have to be equal for both models. Specifically we define book value of equity as E = V − D i − d i and then match ∂P D/∂E from the Merton model with the corresponding value from the network model. We use book value of equity because for regulatory purposes bank equity is defined in book value terms. Our conditions are chosen to enable a fair comparison between the models since we want to analyze how the PD changes with bank capital. The graphs look similar for the other banks and the results are robust with respect to different asset value growth rates µ. The dotted line in Figure 1 illustrates the spillover effect by depicting bank 2's PD as a function of bank 3's capital. In a Merton framework correlations in bank defaults can only be driven by asset correlations but changing one bank's capitalization has no effect on other banks' PDs. Asset fire sales and contagion externalities cause an increase in bank 2's PD as bank 3 reduces its capital. Table 1 . Consistent with the severity of the macro scenario, mean default rates are much higher than historic peaks.
21 19 The sectoral classification used in constructing the default rates is the one used by banks in reporting their balance sheet loan exposures. The seven sectors included were accommodation, agriculture, construction, manufacturing, retail, wholesale, and mortgages in the household sector. For more details on the construction of historical default rates, see Misina and Tessier (2007) . 20 The FSAP scenario assumes a recession that is about one-third larger than experienced in the early 1990s. See Lalonde, Misina, Muir, St-Amant, and Tessier (2008) for a detailed description of the scenario. Sectoral distributions of default rates are centered on fitted values from sectoral regressions, and are generated using the correlation structure of historical default rates. See Misina, Tessier, and Dey (2006) for more details on the simulation of default rates. 21 A key component in modeling credit losses is banks' sectoral Exposure-at default (EAD). Since the sectoral classification used for reporting EADs by banks under Basel II is more aggregated than the one used in constructing default rates, we simulated for each Basel II sector a distribution of weighted average default rate (P D w ) according to:
where k represents the number of balance sheet sub-sectors that can be subsumed in one of the Basel II sectors, P D i represents our model's default rates of sector i, and BSE i the corresponding balance sheet exposure. Table 2 shows the importance of considering both sources of uncertainty. When considering systematic factors only, expected losses to the 6 big banks average $45.7 Billion or 47.7 percent of total Tier 1 Capital, with a standard deviation of $7.9 Billion. Taking both systematic and idiosyncratic factors into account, the expected losses are approximately the same ($46.4 Billion on average), and, not surprisingly, are larger in the tail of the distribution (the 99 percent VaR is $68.7 Billion as compared to $63.7 Billion in the first distribution). As a consequence, the frequency of bank defaults varies from zero when only systematic factors are considered, to 0.06 percent on average (ranging between 0 and 0.19 percent) with both sources of uncertainty. 22 A recent overview on different standard approaches to model credit risk is Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2000) . CreditRisk+ is a trademark of Credit Suisse Financial Products (CSFP). It is described in detail in Credit Suisse (1997) . 23 There is little information on loss-given-default in Canada. Based on available information from the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Misina, Tessier, and Dey (2006) estimated an average loss-given-bankruptcy over the 1988-2006 period of 65%. This overstates losses in case of default because bankruptcy is the last stage of distress, and includes more than losses related to missed interest payments. 24 Under Basel II, banks are required to provide an estimate of the credit exposure of a facility, should that facility go into default at the risk horizon (typically one year). A complete description of linkages between banks requires a complete matrix of the bilateral exposures. Such a complete matrix was available only for exposures related to derivatives.
Bilateral exposures from interbank lending and cross shareholdings were estimated under the assumption that banks spread their lending and borrowing as widely as possible across all other banks using an entropy maximization algorithm (see e.g. Blien and Graef (1997) ). 28 This approach might underestimate contagion as it assumes that all lending and borrowing activities between banks are completely diversified. As a robustness check, banks' bilateral exposures were also estimated under the assumption that concentrations of exposures between banks are broadly consistent with their asset sizes. As shown in Table 3 , banks' bilateral exposures are comparable under these two assumptions. We find that our estimate of bilateral exposures from interbank lending is similar to the bilateral exposures related to derivatives (not shown). 26 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the major Canadian banks often rely on collateral to mitigate their exposures to OTC derivatives. However, as Stulz (2009) points out, even full collateralization can leave a bank with counterparty risk. 27 These returns provide for each bank aggregate holdings of all domestic financial institutions' shares. Due to data limitations, cross-shareholdings among the Big Six banks were estimated by (i) distributing the aggregate holdings of a given bank according to the ratio of its assets to total assets of domestic financial institutions, and (ii) excluding shares that were held for trading (assuming that they are perfectly hedged).
28 For a system of six banks we need to estimate a 6x6 matrix of bilateral exposures. we do know, however that the diagonal is zero (as no bank lends to itself) and we know the row and column sums that represent banks total borrowing and lending in the interbank market. Thus we need to estimate 30 exposures given 12 constraints. 
Results
In this section, we first present the results from simulations considering the two contagion channels described above. We then address the probability of a systemic crisis and move towards identifying systemic banks. Finally, we compare the outcome of different mechanisms of capital allocation according to individual contribution to systemic risk. Table 4 reports the results obtained from simulations considering potential contagion from network and asset fire-sale effects for 1 million generated credit losses assuming that the minimum price of the illiquid asset P min = 0.98, i.e. the stock of illiquid assets at each bank can at most lose 2% in value, even when banks sell all their holdings. 29 Two percent write-down of all A default is called fundamental when credit losses are sufficient to wipe out all the capital of the bank as defined in Equation (19). Column three in Table 4 summarizes the PD from defaults due to interbank contagion without asset fire sales, i.e. when a bank has sufficient capital to absorb the credit losses in the non-bank sectors but is pushed to bankruptcy because of losses on its exposures to other banks (as defined in Equation (21) with p * = 1). The third category of default is the contagion due to asset fire sales as defined in Equation (20). In these cases a bank has enough capital to withstand both the credit losses in the non-banking sector and the write-down on other banks' exposures but not enough to withstand the mark-to-market losses due to its own asset fire sale and/or the asset fire sale of the other banks. Asset fire sales will also weaken the surviving banks and thus make them more prone to contagion as reflected in column five (Contagious PD (AFS)), which records the defaults defined in Equation (21) with p * < 1. Total PD is the sum of columns two, four, and five and summarizes the total PD of a bank including the effect of asset fire sales. The Canadian banking system is very stable without the consideration of asset fire sales.
The impact of contagion channels
Both fundamental and contagious PDs are well below 20 basis points, even though we generate high loan losses due to an extreme macro scenario throughout the paper. In the asset fire sale scenario, troubled banks want to maintain regulatory capital requirements by selling off assets, which causes externalities for all other banks as asset prices fall. PDs increase and as banks get weaker because of writedowns they also become more susceptible for contagion. We find that banks 2, 4 and 6 have a higher risk of defaulting due to asset writedowns. While banks 1, 3
and 5 are more likely to survive writedowns, losses to bank 3 and 5 weaken them substantially so that they are more likely to default due to second round interbank contagion. Overall, banks
have PDs ranging from 6.43 to 11.65. Bank 1 and 5 stand out with the lowest PDs while bank 6 has the highest one. The bankruptcy probability jumps dramatically as market liquidity decreases. In columns two to four of table 5 we allow asset prices to drop 50% more than in the base scenario. We immediately see that our analysis is very sensitive to the minimum asset price, which defines our demand function for the illiquid asset. Allowing fire sale discounts of three percent increases banks' PDs significantly. All banks default almost in two out of three cases. Default correlation is almost one (not shown), which explains why the total PDs are almost identical. While banks 2 and 4 are very likely to default because of writedowns in the value of their illiquid assets, banks 3, 6 and especially bank 5 are more likely to be affected by contagion. Two possible reasons could explain why these results are so sensitive to asset fire sale discounts. First, high Tier 1 capital requirements of 7%, compared to the 4% under Basel rules, trigger asset fire sales early, causing other banks to follow. Second the small number of banks causes each bank to have a huge price impact when selling off illiquid securities, creating negative externalities for the whole system.
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Two policy insights stand out from the latter results. First, in the last financial crisis, regulators were criticized for helping banks to offload assets from their balance sheets at subsidized prices and for relaxing accounting rules, which allowed banks to avoid mark-to-market writedowns of their assets. While our analysis cannot show the long-term costs associated with these measures, we can at least document that there is a significant immediate benefit for financial stability by preventing asset fire sale induced writedowns. Second, a countercyclical reduction in the minimum Tier 1 capital requirements would reduce the risk of default triggered by AFS unconditional probability of default, and see total credit risk as the sum of the fundamental PD (the PD conditional on not having liquidity problems because of an AFS or interbank funding problems) and the PD due to liquidity problems. 31 Besides the systemic aspect of the individual banks, the calibration of the demand curve is a key factor, and requires judgment about the health and willingness to buy of other market players under the scenario. Table 5 . Severe asset fire sales and partial interbank data, N = 1 million: AFS PD refers to the probability of default stemming from writedowns due to asset fire sales. Contagious PD (AFS) includes the defaults that arise because of contagion after writedowns have been realized in banks' balance sheets. Total PD (AFS) is the sum of fundamental PD (from Table 4 ), AFS PD, and contagious PD (AFS). Columns 2 to 4 show PDs when minimum price of the illiquid asset is reduced to P min = 0.97. Columns 5 to 7 repeat the base scenario considering only exposures from interbank deposits.
Bank AFS PD Contagious PD (AFS) Total PD AFS PD Contagious PD (AFS) Total PD (All data, P min =0.97, in %) (IB deposits only, P min =0. dramatically.
The right part of Table 5 presents the results when the matrix of exposures between banks is restricted to interbank deposits. Since most of the previous literature analyzing exposures between banks focuses on the interbank deposit market, these results serve as a good benchmark of the models in previous papers. Without cross-shareholdings and derivatives exposures we get substantially lower PDs for some banks as well as a very different ranking of banks' PDs.
Given that most regulators around the world do not have access to data for derivatives exposure between banks, our analysis shows that inaccurate data can lead to severe underestimation of systemic risk by regulators' offsite analysis models.
The probability of a financial crisis
So far we examined the impact of contagion through linkages among banks and asset fire sales on the individual bank's riskiness. In this Section we want to address the probability of a systemic crisis and move towards identifying systemically relevant banks. Table 6 shows the probability that one to six banks default simultaneously in our stress scenario. In almost 25% of the cases in which a default is observed, contagion is contained as only one bank defaults. However, default correlation is relatively high as five or six banks Table 6 . Probability of multiple bank defaults: column two lists the probabilities that one to six banks default simultaneously in the given macro stress scenario including asset fire sales and a minimum price of the illiquid asset P min = 0.98. Columns three to eight show for each row n the probability that a particular bank defaults given that a total of n banks default.
Number Probability probability of involvement of bank defaults (in 4.94 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
would default in more than fifty percent of the cases. For each row n, Columns three to eight show the PD of each bank conditional on the default of n banks. Bank 1 and 5 have a low default correlation with other banks as they are less likely to default in scenarios of multiple defaults. In contrast, banks three, four and six are almost always involved when three or more banks default.
Identifying which banks contribute most to the probability of a systemic crisis is not straightforward. One approach is to see which banks are most often involved in multiple bank defaults. Table 7 shows the likelihood that one to six banks will default conditional on the default of a specific bank, i.e. row 2 column 6 shows the probability that exactly four banks default, conditional on the default of bank 2. Again, mainly because of contagion due to AFS, we see that banks' defaults are correlated as the default of any bank is associated with the wipeout of at least four other banks with close to 80% probability on average. Based on this approach, banks 2 and 6 are less involved in a systemic crisis, as there is more than a 10% chance that their default will be contained and not associated with a domino effect. They are indeed the only two banks with a lower than 80% probability of being involved when more than 3 banks default. On the opposite, bank 5 is most likely to be involved in more than three defaults.
In the recent crisis there has been a lot of discussion on the topic of systemically relevant banks. Similar to Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006b) we compute in Table 8 for each bank the probability of default conditional on one other bank's default. We can see again that banks in our sample are interdependent. The default of any one bank is associated with the default of Table 7 . Probability of multiple bank defaults conditional on a bank's default: column two contains for each bank one to six the PD in the given macro stress scenario including asset fire sales and a minimum price of the illiquid asset P min = 0.98. Columns three to eight show for each row n the probability of one to six total defaults conditional on bank n's default. Table 8 . Individual bank default probability conditional on the default of a specific bank in the given macro stress scenario including asset fire sales and a minimum price of the illiquid asset P min = 0.98: Column 2 shows the PD for each bank. Columns 3 to 8 of row n show each bank's PD conditional of bank n's default. 
Macroprudential capital requirements
Macroprudential capital requirements attempt to internalize the externalities in the financial system. The results presented above show that network and asset fire sales externalities are important and should be taken into account in designing capital requirements policy. Table Table 9 . Capital requirements for selected macroprudential capital allocation rules in percent of observed tier 1 capital (in %): Capital requirements are computed such that they match the risk contributions under the five risk allocation mechanisms. Loss distributions are computed for the macro stress scenario including asset fire sales and a minimum price of the illiquid asset P min = 0.98
Bank Table 10 . Correlation between macroprudential capital ratio, defined as capital over total assets, and bank characteristics. One, two, and three starts correspond to significance at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Loss distributions are computed for the macro stress scenario including asset fire sales and a minimum price of the illiquid asset P min = 0.98 Table 5 showing the relatively higher (lower) default probabilities of undercapitalized (overcapitalized) banks. Bank 6 for example should double its capital according to the ∆CoVaR methodology. Table 10 shows correlations between macroprudential capital ratio, defined as capital over total assets, and some bank's characteristics. Macroprudential capital requirements are not trivially related to individual bank PDs or size. The correlation of macroprudential capital ratios and total assets are between -0.86 and -0.25 with four out of five not being significantly different from zero. This finding is not consistent with the suggestion that larger banks pose a greater threat to systemic risk and should be required to hold more capital. 32 The lack of correlation with PDs as well, suggest that macroprudential capital requirements is likely based on a combination of factors. Interestingly, holdings of interbank assets as a proportion of total assets are significantly and positively correlated with macroprudential capital requirements, whereas that correlation is negative and only marginally significant for interbank liabilities. Our results are therefore consistent with a bank's macroprudential requirement being an insurance against potential losses caused by its interbank counterparties, and not against losses it may cause to them. Finally, macroprudential capital requirements are not significantly related to regulatory capital ratios, but strongly correlated with a leverage ratio measured as Tier 1/TA. This supports the current international initiatives to regulate leverage ratios.
Compared to the observed capital levels, all macroprudential capital allocations reduce the default probability of the average bank. Table 11 shows the default probabilities of the six banks under the observed capital ratio, the "Basel equal" benchmark, as well as under the five macroprudential allocations. The Component VaR method creates relatively homogeneous PDs for all banks, increasing the likelihood of default for bank 1, but making banks 2 to 6 less prone to default. The incremental VaR and Shapley allocations leave bank 3 and 5's PD relatively unchanged but reduce the PD for banks 1 and 4 and 6 substantially. The ∆CoVaR reduces Bank 6 PD to almost zero. It is interesting to note that all risk allocation mechanisms work roughly equally well and bring a substantial improvement relative to the existing regulatory framework. Table 12 . Probability of multiple bank defaults under selected macroprudential capital allocation rules (in %): The table shows the probabilities that one to six banks will default simultaneously. Default probabilities are computed for the macro stress scenario including asset fire sales and a minimum price of the illiquid asset P min = 0.98. Column two is identical to column two in All five macroprudential capital requirements also reduce risk in the banking system. Table   12 presents the probability of multiple bank defaults for the five capital allocation rules. Especially incremental VaR and the Shapley value allocations and the ∆CoVaR reduce the probability of multiple bank failures significantly. Under Shapley value based capital allocations the probability of five or six banks defaulting can be reduced from 7.6%, which is based on current banks' capital levels, to 5.5%. This corresponds to a 27% reduction in the probability of a financial crisis. 
Conclusions
One objective of macroprudential regulation is to internalize the externalities within the financial system. In this paper, we find that financial stability can be enhanced substantially by implementing a systemic perspective on bank regulation. All of the risk allocation mechanisms that we investigated yield to a substantial decrease in both the default probabilities of individual institutions and the probability of multiple bank defaults.
We explicitly recognize that overall risk of the system, default correlations, and banks' risk contributions will change once capital gets reallocated and therefore set macroprudential capital requirements as a fixed point for which capital allocations are consistent with the contributions of each bank to the total risk of the banking system, under the proposed capital allocations.
To measure how overall risk changes with capital allocations we use a model which explicitly considers contagion effects through network and asset fire sale externalities and sheds light on their importance. We generate an aggregate loss distribution of the banking system using a stress-testing model that integrates credit and market liquidity risk in a network of exposures between banks. To better capture the likelihood of contagion default, we use a unique sample of the Canadian banking system, which includes detailed information on interbank linkages including OTC derivatives.
Our findings have important policy implications for future bank regulation. For our sample, all of the analyzed macroprudential capital mechanisms brought a substantial reduction for bank risk. It is therefore probably more important for policymakers to implement a systemic perspective on bank regulation rather than to find the best risk allocation mechanism.
Implementing macroprudential capital requirements in practice will not be easy. Bank regulators will need to collect a large amount of data and especially information on the interbank exposures between banks. While we were lucky to have that information for the Canadian banks, in many countries around the world, this information is unavailable. Another hurdle will be to base each bank's capital requirements not solely on that bank's characteristics. Banks will complain to be treated unfairly as banks with a similar asset mix will be charged with different capital allocations based on systemic importance. One possible way to implement macroprudential capital requirements in to augment existing capital ratios with a charge that is based on regulatory assessment, similar to FDIC premiums, which are in part determined by the the primary regulator's discretionary composite rating.
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33 See also Acharya, Santos, and Yorulmazer (forthcoming) for a mechanism to determine deposit insurance premiums in the presence of systemic risk. 
A Fixed point convergence
In this appendix we want to achive two objectives: first we will demonstrate that the fixed point can differ substantially from a simple risk attribution analysis in which banks' risk contributions are computed given the observed level of bank capital. Second, we want to provide some evidence that the fixed point is well defined. Because of the nonlinear nature of the model that we use for clearing the interbank claims and computing bank PDs, we cannot explicitly prove the uniqueness of the fixed point that determines the macroprudential capital requirements. To check for robustness we performed a Monte Carlo analysis by using alternative starting values and found that all of them converged to the same fixed point.
To show that the macroprudential capital requirements as they are computed throughout the paper using a fixed point can differ substantially from the capital that one would attribute to a bank using a simple risk attribution analysis, we compare fixed point macroprudential capital allocations C * = f (Σ(C * )) as defined in Equation (1) with the results of a simple risk allocation analysis C 1 = f (Σ(C 0 )), where C 0 is the observed tier 1 capital for each bank. C 1 can also be interpreted as the first iteration of an iterative procedure C i = f (Σ(C i−1 )) which can be used to find the fixed point C * = lim i→∞ C i .
We compute the following statistic z, defined as
For all the methods described in Section 2
We can interpret z as the fraction of the adjustment in bank capital that is realized in the first iteration. Ideally z = 1, in which case the risk attribution analysis yields a fixed point. A value of z > 1 indicates overadjustment in the sense that banks that should increase (decrease) capital according to the macroprudential perspective are allocated too much (too little) under the risk attribution analysis. A value of z < 1 can be interpreted as partial adjustment in the sense that banks that a risk allocation mechanism underestimates any required increases or decreases in bank capital. Table 14 shows z for all risk allocation mechanisms. We find that four out of five mechanisms overadjust capital, sometimes substantially. Adjusting bank capital using component VaR risk contributions based on observed capital can be wrong by a factor of up to three. We thus can see the importance of considering the fact that overall risk as well as each bank's risk contribution changes when bank capital requirements change. While the first four risk allocation measures tend to overadjust, the ∆CoVaR measure can -at least for our sample -also under adjust.
In our algorithm for finding the fixed point we compensate for the problem of overadjustment by changing capital from one iteration to the next only by a fraction γ < 1 of the adjustment that has been proposed by the risk allocation mechanism, i.e. we use C i = (1 − γ)C i−1 + γf (Σ(C i−1 )), where we found γ = 0.5 to yield numerically stable results.
To check for uniqueness of the fixed point we run a Monte Carlo simulation using alternative starting capital values C 0 and check that all of them converge to the same fixed point. Finding the fixed point is numerically intensive because we have to run a full Monte Carlo simulation in every iteration to get the joint loss and default distribution Σ. In this robustness check we draw 100 random capital endowments for the banks with the restriction that each bank has to be above the minimum capital requirement of 7% of risk weighted assets and that the total capital in the banking system stays the same. We find that our procedure converges to the same fixed point for all starting values. Figure 2 shows the norm of the distance to the fixed point |C i − C * | over the first 15 iterations for the first 50 starting values and the Shapley Value-expected loss risk attribution model. While we cannot provide a formal proof, evidence from our simulations makes us confident that for our data macroprudential capital requirements are well defined. 
